The Blessings of Destruction
第3章 战祸之福
So we have finished with the broken window. An elementary fallacy. Anybody, one would think, would be able to avoid it after a few moments’ thought. Yet the broken-window fallacy, under a hundred disguises, is the most persistent in the history of economics. It is more rampant now than at any time in the past. It is solemnly reaffirmed every day by great captains of industry, by chambers of commerce, by labor union leaders, by editorial writers and newspaper columnists and radio and television commentators, by learned statisticians using the most refined techniques, by professors of economics in our best universities. In their various ways they all dilate upon the advantages of destruction.
讲完粗浅的“破窗谬论”,有人会说,任何人只要动脑筋想一想,一定不会犯这样的错误。事实上,穿着各种伪装的破窗谬论,在经济学历史上却最为顽固不化,而且此种谬论在过去任何时候都没有现在这么盛行。如今,每天都有许多人在一本正经地重复着同样的错误。这些人包括工业巨头、商会和工会领袖、社论主笔、报纸专栏作家、电台与电视台的评论员、技巧高深的统计专家、一流大学的经济学教授。他们正在用各自的方式宣扬破坏行为所带来的好处。
Though some of them would disdain to say that there are net benefits in small acts of destruction, they see almost endless benefits in enormous acts of destruction. They tell us how much better off economically we all are in war than in peace. They see “miracles of production” which it requires a war to achieve. And they see a world made prosperous by an enormous “accumulated” or “backed-up” demand. In Europe, after World War II, they joyously counted the houses, the whole cities that had been leveled to the ground and that “had to be replaced.” In America they counted the houses that could not be built during the war, the nylon stockings that could not be supplied, the worn-out automobiles and tires, the obsolescent radios and refrigerators. They brought together formidable totals.
尽管他们中有些人不屑于承认小小的破坏行为中也存在着净利益,但他们都确信,巨大的破坏行为能让人们受益无穷。他们吹嘘战争对经济是如何如何的有利,非和平时期能比,并向我们展示通过战争才能实现的“生产奇迹”。他们认为,战争时期庞大的需求“累积”或“堵塞”,会给战后的世界带来繁荣。第二次世界大战结束后,他们兴致勃勃地清点那些在欧洲被战火夷为平地、必须重建的房子和城市。在美国,他们清点出战争期间无力兴建的房子、短缺的尼龙袜、破旧的汽车和轮胎、过时的收音机和电冰箱。他们得出了一个令人生畏的经济总量。
It was merely our old friend, the broken-window fallacy, in new clothing, and grown fat beyond recognition. This time it was supported by a whole bundle of related fallacies. It confused need with demand. The more war destroys, the more it impoverishes, the greater is the postwar need. Indubitably. But need is not demand. Effective economic demand requires not merely need but corresponding purchasing power. The needs of India today are incomparably greater than the needs of America. But its purchasing power, and therefore the “new business” that it can stimulate, are incomparably smaller.
这种“需求堵塞”谬论只不过是我们所熟悉的老朋友——破窗谬论——换上一件臃肿的马甲之后的形象而已。不过这一次,有更多相关的谬误绞缠在一起,需要我们逐一驳斥。首先,它把需要(need)和需求(demand)混为一谈。战火摧毁的东西越多,它所造成的贫困越严重,战后的需要量就越大。这是毫无疑问的。但是,需要并不等于需求。有效的经济需求,光有需要还不算,还必须要有相当的购买力才行。当今印度对产品的实际需要相对于美国的需要来讲简直大得不可比,但是它的购买力,以及由此可以刺激起来的“新的生意”相对于美国来讲却是微不足道的。
But if we get past this point, there is a chance for another fallacy, and the broken-windowites usually grab it. They think of “purchasing power” merely in terms of money. Now money can be run off by the printing press. As this is being written, in fact, printing money is the world’s biggest industry—if the product is measured in monetary terms. But the more money is turned out in this way, the more the value of any given unit of money falls. This falling value can be measured in rising prices of commodities. But as most people are so firmly in the habit of thinking of their wealth and income in terms of money, they consider themselves better off as these monetary totals rise, in spite of the fact that in terms of things they may have less and buy less. Most of the “good” economic results which people at the time attributed to World War II were really owing to wartime inflation. They could have been, and were, produced just as well by an equivalent peacetime inflation. We shall come back to this money illusion later.
不过,就算绕过了上一个谬误,接下来还有可能陷入另一种谬误。持破窗谬论的人常犯只从货币的角度去思考“购买力”的错误。其实,只要让印钞机开足马力,不愁没有钞票。要是以货币来衡量“产品”价值的话,那么以钞票为产品的印钞业,无疑是当今世上规模最大的产业。但是用这种方式去解决购买力问题,所印制的钞票数量越多,单位货币的价值就越贬值,货币贬值的程度可以用物价上涨的幅度来衡量。然而,大多数人只习惯于用金钱来衡量自己的财富和收入,所以只要手头多了几张钞票,便以为自己过得更好,尽管拿这些钱能买到的东西比从前少,自己实际拥有的东西可能不如从前。现在,很多人把一些“好的”经济成果归功于第二次世界大战,其实,其中绝大部分是战时通货膨胀造成的。哪怕在和平年代,同等规模的通货膨胀也能带来这样的结果,并且的确产生过这些结果。后面我们还会回过头来谈这种货币幻觉。
Now there is a half-truth in the “backed-up” demand fallacy, just as there was in the broken-window fallacy. The broken window did make more business for the glazier. The destruction of war did make more business for the producers of certain things. The destruction of houses and cities did make more business for the building and construction industries. The inability to produce automobiles, radios, and refrigerators during the war did bring about a cumulative postwar demand for those particular products.
“需求堵塞”谬论只讲出了一半的真相,这点跟破窗谬论一样。被砸破的橱窗的确会给玻璃店带来生意,战争造成的破坏也的确给某些产品的制造商带来了大量的商机。房子和城市的毁于战火,为建筑业赢得了更多业务,而战争期间没办法生产的汽车、收音机和电冰箱,确实为那些特定的产品带来累积性的战后需求。
To most people this seemed like an increase in total demand, as it partly was in terms of dollars of lower purchasing power. But what mainly took place was a diversion of demand to these particular products from others. The people of Europe built more new houses than otherwise because they had to. But when they built more houses they had just that much less manpower and productive capacity left over for everything else. When they bought houses they had just that much less purchasing power for something else. Wherever business was increased in one direction, it was (except insofar as productive energies were stimulated by a sense of want and urgency) correspondingly reduced in another.
这一半的真相在大部分人看来,就像是总需求增加了。从单位货币的购买力降低的角度来说,一部分增长是的确如此【通胀导致需求增加是一个宏观经济学的结论——译者注】。不过更主要的原因还是需求从其他地方转向了这些特定的产品。欧洲人盖出了空前数量的新房子,因为他们必须先解决安居问题。可是,在他们兴建更多房屋时,可用于生产其他产品的人力和生产能力的减少程度与之相当。人们买了房子之后,可用于购买其他产品的支付能力的减少程度与之相当。人总是顾得了一头,就顾不了另一头(当然,要除开额外增加的被饥寒交迫的紧张感所激发出来的更大的生产能量)。
The war, in short, changed the postwar direction of effort; it changed the balance of industries; it changed the structure of industry.
简单地说,战争改变了人们在战后的努力方向;战争打破了各行各业原有的平衡;战争重塑了工业的结构。
(未完待续)