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第16章 “稳定”物价
 
（接前面部分）
 
The case is different, however, when the State steps in and either buys the farmers’ crops itself or lends them the money to hold the crops off the market. This is sometimes done in the name of maintaining what is plausibly called an “ever-normal granary. But the history of prices and annual carryovers of crops shows that this function, as we have seen, is already being well performed by the privately organized free markets. When the government steps in, the ever-normal granary becomes in fact an ever-political granary. The farmer is encouraged, with the taxpayers’ money, to withhold his crops excessively. Because they wish to make sure of retaining the farmer’s vote, the politicians who initiate the policy, or the bureaucrats who carry it out, always place the so-called fair price for the farmer’s product above the price that supply and demand conditions at the time justify. This leads to a falling off in buyers. The ever-normal granary therefore tends to become an ever-abnormal granary. Excessive stocks are held off the market. The effect of this is to secure a higher price temporarily than would otherwise exist, but to do so only by bringing about later on a much lower price than would otherwise have existed. For the artificial shortage built up this year by withholding part of a crop from the market means an artificial surplus the next year.

然而，当政府介入这一过程，情况就完全不同了，无论是政府收购农民的谷物，还是贷款给农民让他们囤积谷物，暂不上市销售。有时，这是以维护所谓的“常平仓贮”（ever-normal granary）的名义来实施的。但是正如前面说过的，这个功能已经由私人组织的自由市场执行得很好，谷物价格和每年的谷物存货结转纪录已经证明了这一点。当政府介入之后，常平仓贮其实成了政治仓贮。政府用纳税人的钱，鼓励农民囤积了过多的谷物。政治人物瞄准的是农民的选票，为此，提出这种政策的政客，或实施这种政策的官僚，总是给农产品定一个所谓的公平价格，使之高于当时的供需状况所允许的价位。这必然导致买家减少，常平仓贮因此往往成为常不平仓贮。过多的谷物被囤积在市场之外，其结果是暂时保证了一个高于正常情况的价格。然而，这样做只会带来此后比正常情况更低的价格。因为，该年通过囤积一部分粮食，使之不能被投放到市场上去，这造成人为的短缺，这将意味着来年人为造成的过剩。
 
It would carry us too far afield to describe in detail what actually happened* when this program was applied, for example, to Amencan cotton. We piled up an entire year’s crop in storage. We destroyed the foreign market for our cotton. We stimulated enormously the growth of cotton in other countries. Though these results had been predicted by opponents of the restriction and loan policy, when they actually happened the bureaucrats responsible for the result merely replied that they would have happened anyway.

我们若去详述在这种政策下实际将会发生的情况，我们恐怕会离题太远，比如说，对美国棉花种植业的影响。{footnotes: 不过，棉花生产和销售的计划方案是一个特别有启发的例子。截止1956年8月1日，美国棉花储备量达到了破纪录的数字1452.9万包，这比整整一年正常的产量或消费量还要多。为了解决这个问题，政府改变它的计划，决定从生产者那里购买大部分收成，再立即折价转售。为了夺回美国棉花的国际市场，政府对棉花采取出口补贴，一开始每磅补贴6美分，到1961年，提高到8.5美分。这一政策在减少原棉储备上确实取得了成功。但是，除了它强加给纳税人的损失外，它还是的美国的纺织品与外国的纺织品相比，无论在国内市场还是在国际市场上，都处于严重的竞争劣势。因为这样做等于补贴了外国纺织业，被牺牲掉的是美国纺织业。这是典型的政府定价方案。为了避免出现一个人们不希望产生的后果，整个经济陷入了另一种并且是更糟糕的境地。}{endnotes:黑兹利特加入脚注之后，情况并没有好转。据《投资者财经日报》（Investor’s Business Daily ，1995年9月29日），“从1986年至1993年，政府的棉花计划耗资120亿美元，平均每年要花15亿美元。跟许多农产品计划一样，政府将大量的钱抱给为数不多的生产者。在1993年，政府补贴支付给了大约9.6万户棉农。”强加在消费者头上的额外成本也相当高。美国审计总署（GAO）在1995年7月20日发布的一项研究结果显示，过去8年，棉花计划耗费的社会成本平均每年为7.38亿美元。这份GAO报告的结论认为，“政府的棉花计划，已经陷入代价高昂的，由国内国际价格组成的迷阵之中，棉农从中获益而政府和社会为此牺牲很大。”美国第104届国会改革此棉花计划的努力以失败告终。}我们囤积了整整一年的棉花收成，不拿去出口，从而刺激其他国家棉产量增长，致使本国棉花的海外市场被破坏。尽管反对这种限制和贷款政策的人们早已预计到了这样的结果，但等到事情真的发生了，那些对此后果负有责任的官僚们却只是轻描淡写地说：这本来就是无论如何都要发生的事情。
 
For the loan policy is usually accompanied by, or inevitably leads to, a policy of restricting production — i.e., a policy of scarcity. In nearly every effort to “stabilize” the price of a commodity, the interests of the producers have been put first. The real object is an immediate boost of prices. To make this possible, a proportional restriction of output is usually placed on each producer subject to the control. This has several immediately bad effects. Assuming that the control can be imposed on an international scale, it means that total world production is cut. The world’s consumers are able to enjoy less of that product than they would have enjoyed without restriction. The world is just that much poorer. Because consumers are forced to pay higher prices than otherwise for that product, they have just that much less to spend on other products.

贷款政策通常伴随着限产政策，有时则不可避免地引出限产政策——也就是人为制造出短缺。几乎在每次努力“稳定”物价的时候，总是叫喊“生产者利益第一”。实际的目标则是使价格立即上涨。为了使涨价成为可能，政府通常会对受管制的每一位生产者采取一定比例的限产措施。这种限制会立即产生几个坏影响。假设可以在国际范围内实施这种控制的话，那么，它将意味着世界总产出的削减。因此，全球消费者能够享用那种产品的数量，比不受限制的时候更少。世界也就贫穷了那么多。由于消费者为此被迫支付高价，以高于应有水平的价格购买那种产品，他们也就因此损失了这么多钱来购买其他产品。

（未完待续） 

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